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EASONS ARE CONSIDERATIONS THAT FIGURE in reasoning. 
When I believe or act for a reason, my reason plays a role in the rea-
soning through which I arrive at my belief  or action. Of  course, not 
all of  the reasons for which I believe or act are good reasons; not all explanato-
ry reasons are normative or justifying reasons.1 If  reasons in general are consid-
erations that figure in reasoning, normative reasons are considerations that fig-
ure in sound reasoning. 
This broad view about the connection between normative reasons and 
sound reasoning is widely held.2 Those who hold it often regard it as obvi-
ous – boring, even. As Kieran Setiya puts it: 
 
It is a harmlessly illuminating principle that connects two things which surely must 
be connected: facts being reasons …, on one side, and the process of  … thinking, 
inference, deliberation, on the other.3 
 
Jonathan Way describes the link between reasons and reasoning as “near plat-
itudinous”: 
 
Reasons are meant to guide us to act, believe, desire, or otherwise respond. But to 
be guided by reasons just is to engage in reasoning, broadly construed. So it is hard 
to see how reasons could fail to be appropriate premises for reasoning towards φ-
ing.4 
 
The idea of  a connection between normative reasons and sound reasoning 
does seem platitudinous. However, I think it actually has surprising and far-
reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to 
sound reasoning may strike us as “harmlessly illuminating,” but only because 
                                                
1 Many philosophers use the term “motivating reason” to refer to the reasons for which we act 
or believe. I prefer the term “explanatory reason” for the reasons outlined by J. D. Velleman 
(2004) “Replies to Discussion on The Possibility of  Practical Reason,” Philosophical Studies 121(3): 
279. In adopting this terminology, I do not mean to deny that there are various considera-
tions that figure in explanations but that are not reasons for which anything is done or be-
lieved. 
2 See for instance J. Raz (1975) Practical Reason and Norms, London: Hutchinson & Co., p. 28; 
B. Williams (1981) “Internal and External Reasons,” in Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 103-4; J. D. Velleman (1989) Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, ch. 7; R. Audi (2004) “Reasons, Practical Reason, and Practical Reasoning,” 
Ratio 17(2): 119-45; P. Hieronymi (2005) “The Wrong Kind of  Reason,” Journal of  Philosophy 
102(9): 437-57; K. Setiya (2007) Reasons without Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University, p. 
12, and (2014) “What Is a Reason to Act?” Philosophical Studies 167(2): 221-35; and J. Way 
(forthcoming) “Reasons as Premises of  Good Reasoning,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 
3 Setiya (2014: 223). 
4 Way (forthcoming: 1). 
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we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the 
view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another 
(soundness). I shall argue, though, that soundness is also a descriptive phe-
nomenon, one we can pick out with purely descriptive terms, and that the 
connection between normative reasons and sound reasoning therefore pro-
vides the basis for a reductive account of  reasons. Like all proposed reduc-
tions, this one must confront some version of  G. E. Moore’s open question 
argument. I shall argue that a reductive view rooted in the idea that reasons 
figure in sound reasoning is well equipped to meet the open question chal-




Following both Setiya and Way, I shall take as my starting point the idea that 
normative reasons are premises in sound reasoning. More specifically, I shall 
follow Way in supposing that a consideration R is a reason for some response 
φ just in case R is a premise in sound reasoning that concludes in φ-ing.5 
As Way has pointed out, the hypothesis that reasons are premises of  
sound reasoning sheds light on a number of  puzzles about reasons. It ex-
plains what the various kinds of  reasons – reasons for action, reasons for 
belief, reasons for desire, and so forth – have in common, why we can have 
normative reasons only for attitudes we can reach through reasoning, and 
why some of  the considerations that count in favor of  a response are the 
wrong kind of  reason for that response.6 The hypothesis also raises a number 
of  questions, the most pressing of  which concerns the nature of  soundness. 
Just what is sound reasoning? The short answer is that sound reasoning is 
good or correct reasoning: to reason soundly is to reason well – to reason as one 
should. If  that is all we can say about soundness, then the hypothesis that 
normative reasons figure in sound reasoning really will be harmless. I believe 
we can say more, though. I accept the short answer: sound reasoning is good 
or correct reasoning, and so soundness is indeed a normative property. How-
ever, I think it is also a descriptive property – a property that can be grasped 
or picked out in purely descriptive terms. To argue for this surprising conclu-
sion, I shall begin with the case of  doxastic reasoning, or reasoning about 
what to believe. I shall then argue that we can understand the soundness of  
                                                
5 Compare Way (forthcoming: 6). Of  course, a consideration can be a normative reason 
without anyone acting for that reason. So, the reasoning in which a normative reason figures 
as a premise need not be a train of  thought undertaken or followed by any actual agent. Put 
another way, that some consideration figures as a premise in sound reasoning is not a psy-
chological claim about how anyone has actually reasoned. Rather, it is a claim about how one 
might reason, and do so soundly. A consideration counts as a reason, then, just in case there 
is some possible course of  sound reasoning in which it figures as a premise. Note that I use 
the general term “response” to refer to the category of  things (including, presumably, vari-
ous attitudes as well as actions) we can have or do for a reason. 
6 For the details of  these explanations, see Way (forthcoming: 7-10). 











As we teach students in introductory logic courses, deductively sound doxas-
tic reasoning is just deductively valid doxastic reasoning from true premises. 
Truth is not a normative concept. Nor, plausibly, is validity. An argument or a 
bit of  reasoning is valid just in case there are no possible worlds in which all 
of  the premises are true and the conclusion false. Validity therefore looks 
more like a modal concept than a normative one. And in that case soundness 
does as well: we can identify an instance of  deductive doxastic reasoning as 
sound without deploying any normative concepts.7 
This appearance could be misleading, of  course. After all, sound reason-
ing is supposed to be good or correct reasoning, and there are all sorts of  unset-
tled questions about the relation between valid reasoning and good or correct 
reasoning. It is widely accepted, for instance, that not all valid inferences are 
good inferences. Suppose that I believe that p and that I come to believe that 
if  p, then q. If  I then infer that q, my inference is clearly valid. Yet it may not 
be the correct inference: if  I have strong independent reasons to think that q 
is false and relatively weak reasons to believe that p, then surely I ought to 
give up my belief  that p. Surely, in other words, I should reason in accordance 
with modus tollens here rather than modus ponens. Either inference would be val-
id, but only one of  them is correct. Likewise, if  I reason from contradictory 
premises to the conclusion that all unicorns are white, then – on at least 
some accounts of  deductive validity – my reasoning is valid. But it is also 
clearly problematic. We must therefore be careful before concluding that we 
can understand sound deductive reasoning in purely logical terms. 
Yet in the cases where deductively valid reasoning falls short of  good or 
correct reasoning, adding that the premises are true takes us the rest of  the 
way. Given any conditional, for instance, we can reason soundly in only one 
direction. Suppose that I correctly believe that if  p, then q. If  p is true, then 
modus ponens is the sound inference. If  p is false, then modus tollens is the sound 
inference. Similarly, we need not worry about inferences from contradictory 
premises, since no such inference can be sound. This suggests that we do not 
need to settle questions about the relation between valid reasoning and cor-
rect reasoning in order to capture the soundness of  deductive doxastic rea-
soning in purely descriptive terms. There are no instances of  deductively 
sound reasoning that fail to be instances of  good or correct reasoning, even 
though there are instances of  bad or incorrect deductively valid reasoning. 
                                                
7 Here I am appealing to an account of  logic like the one defended by G. Harman (1986) 
Change in View: Principles of  Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ch. 2. For an argument to 
the effect that logic is essentially normative, see H. Field (2009) “What Is the Normative 
Role of  Logic?” Proceedings of  the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 81(1): 251-68. 






There is more to doxastic reasoning than deductive syllogisms, however. 
Most doxastic deliberation consists of  inductive or abductive reasoning. Yet 
it is quite plausible that we can also make sense of  the soundness of  these 
other forms of  reasoning in purely descriptive terms. As in the deductive 
case, sound inductive reasoning proceeds from true premises. The connec-
tion between the truth of  the premises and the truth of  the conclusion is 
much looser when it comes to inductive reasoning, though. In a sound induc-
tive inference, although the truth of  the premises does not necessitate the truth 
of  the conclusion, it does probabilize the conclusion or render it more likely. 
As formal epistemologists are fond of  saying, it confirms the conclusion. Of  
course, it also justifies or counts in favor of  our believing the conclusion, and 
thus it is tempting to conclude that the relation between the premises of  a 
sound inductive inference and the conclusion is a normative one. We need 
not resist that temptation: it is indeed a normative relation. But it is also a 
descriptive one – one we can grasp in purely descriptive terms. Although 
sound inductive reasoning is just correct inductive reasoning, it is also just 
reasoning in which true premises probabilize or confirm the conclusion. If  
this is correct, then the soundness of  doxastic reasoning is a descriptive 
property as well as a normative one. 
We might want to reserve the honorific “sound” for instances of  doxas-
tic reasoning in which one takes into account all of  the available considera-
tions that bear on the truth of  the proposition about which one is deliberat-
ing. Suppose I notice that there is water falling outside my window and then 
conclude on the basis of  that observation that it is raining. Is my reasoning 
sound? It may depend on what else I know. For instance, if  I know that it 
almost never rains here, that there is not a cloud in the sky, and that the win-
dows above mine are currently being washed, then presumably I would not 
be reasoning soundly were I to conclude that it is raining. My reasoning 
would be sound only if  I accorded due weight to these other relevant consid-
erations, and were I to do so I would quickly conclude that the water falling 
outside my window has nothing to do with rain. There appears, then, to be 
more to sound doxastic reasoning than realizing that some consideration 
confirms or otherwise supports the truth of  some conclusion and then ac-
cepting that conclusion on the basis of  that realization. 
We can still grasp the differences between sound and unsound doxastic 
reasoning in purely descriptive terms, however. We can capture the full scope 
of  this stronger conception of  sound reasoning by taking our original ac-
count and adding that the premises of  sound reasoning must include all of  
one’s true beliefs that bear one way or the other on the truth of  the conclu-
sion. This ideal of  soundness is probably never realized, of  course. But the 
various ways in which our doxastic reasoning falls short can be articulated 
descriptively. Sometimes we draw conclusions that are not confirmed or oth-
erwise supported by our premises. Other times we fail to incorporate relevant 
considerations in our deliberations. And other times we reason from false 
premises. So even though soundness with respect to doxastic reasoning 






comes in degrees, the differences among those degrees all appear to be de-
scriptive matters. 
This account of  sound doxastic reasoning is likely to be controversial. 
Some will object to my suggestion that the logical relations that hold between 
the premises of  a sound deductive inference and its conclusion can be 
grasped in purely descriptive terms. Others will complain that the notion of  
confirmation that figures in my account of  sound inductive reasoning is irre-
ducibly normative. These are reasonable worries, but I shall not discuss them 
further here. In the sections that follow, I shall instead outline a general theo-
ry of  sound reasoning that takes this account of  sound doxastic reasoning as 
its model. I shall argue that if  we can understand the soundness of  doxastic 
reasoning in purely descriptive terms, then we can understanding the sound-




Reasoning always has an aim. For every kind of  reasoning, there must be 
something that counts as success. Take as an example practical reasoning – 
the kind of  reasoning that usually concludes in an intention or action. One 
account of  the aim of  practical reasoning is uncontroversial: practical reason-
ing aims at figuring out what to do. This characterization, though accurate, is 
incomplete. It specifies only the formal object of  practical reasoning, and – 
as J. David Velleman has argued – “any enterprise that has a formal object 
must have a substantive object as well – that is, a goal that is not stated solely 
in terms that depend on the concept of  being the object of  that enterprise”:8 
 
In the case of  a competitive game, there must be a substantive object of  the game, 
something that constitutes winning but cannot simply consist in winning, so de-
scribed. A game whose object was specifiable only as “winning” wouldn’t have an 
object – that is, wouldn’t have any object in particular. And if  a game had no par-
ticular object, then there would be no such thing as winning it, and so it wouldn’t 
be a fully constituted competitive game. Similarly, a hunt whose object was specifi-
able only as “the quarry” wouldn’t be a fully constituted search, and the question 
“What is the answer?” isn’t by itself  a fully constituted question.9 
 
Practical reasoning as well, then, must have a substantive object or aim: there 
must be something at which practical reasoning aims in virtue of  which it 
aims at figuring out what to do. “A mode of  reasoning whose goal was speci-
fied solely as ‘figuring out what to do’ would be like a search whose object 
was specified solely as ‘figuring out where to look,’ or a question whose ob-
ject was specified solely as ‘figuring out how to reply.’”10 
                                                
8 J. D. Velleman (1996) “The Possibility of  Practical Reason,” Ethics 106(1): 700-1. 
9 Ibid.: 701. 
10 Ibid.: 701-2. This means that Allan Gibbard’s account of  the nature of  practical reasoning 
in (2003) Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 3-8, is radically 
incomplete. There must be more to practical reasoning than the search for “the thing to do” 






The same goes for other kinds of  reasoning. Return for a moment to 
the case of  doxastic reasoning. Formally characterized, the aim of  doxastic 
reasoning is figuring out what to believe. There must be more to the aim than 
this, though. Doxastic reasoning must also have a substantive object or aim. 
As it happens, most philosophers accept a familiar account of  this object – 
namely, the view that doxastic reasoning aims at the truth. Although there is 
less agreement about the respective aims of  other forms of  reasoning (and 
especially about the aim of  practical reasoning), it remains clear that for each 
of  them there must be some substantive object at which it aims. 
Less clear is what is involved in reasoning having an aim. With respect to 
doxastic reasoning, the metaphor of  aiming is cashed out by different philos-
ophers in different ways. Some take the fact that doxastic reasoning aims at 
the truth to be a descriptive fact about the mechanisms causally regulating 
deliberation about what to believe. Others also take it to be conceptual truth 
about correctness conditions for belief. For our purposes here, the weaker, 
teleological claim will suffice. It will be enough for doxastic reasoning to have 
the aim of  truth if  it is regulated by mechanisms geared to produce true be-
liefs. The same goes for other forms of  reasoning. For any distinctive kind of  
reasoning, there will be something substantive we are attempting to settle in 
engaging in that reasoning, and this aim will be operative in whatever mecha-
nisms causally regulate our deliberations. Moreover, if  – as most philoso-
phers believe – reasoning is an essentially rule-governed activity, then the aim 
of  a particular form of  reasoning will at least be implicit in the rules of  in-
ference that govern that reasoning. 
How can we come to know the aim of  a particular form of  reasoning? 
In some cases we may observe it directly – perhaps in the phenomenology of  
the relevant sort of  deliberation. Nishi Shah has argued, for instance, that the 
aim of  belief  is revealed in the phenomenology of  doxastic deliberation: 
“[W]ithin the perspective of  first-person doxastic deliberation … one cannot 
settle on an answer to the question whether to believe that p without taking one-
self  to have answered the question whether p is true.”11 In other cases, our evi-
dence may be more indirect. Velleman contends that hypotheses about the 
aim of  practical reasoning earn credibility “by explaining various otherwise 
                                                
(7). Of  course, “the thing to do” is indeed what we are looking for when we are deliberating 
about what to do, but we cannot look for it solely under that description, just as we cannot 
conduct a search for something that is described solely as “the thing we are looking for.” 
There must be a mark in virtue of  which something counts as the thing for which we are 
searching if  our activity is to constitute a genuine search. Similarly, there must be some mark 
in virtue of  which a course of  action counts as the thing to do, and practical reasoning must 
involve the search for that mark. 
Setiya (2007) acknowledges that practical reasoning has a substantive aim but argues 
that this aim cannot provide a standard of  success or correctness for practical reasoning 
because it is too easy for agents to achieve (107-15). I address Setiya’s argument in (2010) 
“The Standards of  Practical Reasoning,” Philosophical Quarterly 60(20): 671-78. 
11 N. Shah (2003) “How Truth Governs Belief,” Philosophical Review 112(4): 447. 






inexplicable aspects of  agency.”12 He defends his own startling hypothesis 
that practical reasoning aims at intelligibility along precisely such lines. Ac-
cording to Velleman, this hypothesis can explain, among other things, how 
actions can be attributed to agents rather than to other events, how – from 
the deliberative point of  view, at least – we have an open future, how we of-
ten know what we are doing without observation, how our intentions guide 
and constrain our future actions and deliberations, and how we sometimes 
act contrary to our better judgment. The evidence available may be different 
from one kind of  reasoning to the next – and it may frequently go unnoticed 
– but we should nevertheless expect that each distinctive form of  reasoning 




What does all of  this have to do with sound reasoning? I believe that the fact 
that every form of  reasoning must have a substantive aim entails that we can 
understand the soundness of  every form of  reasoning much as we under-
stand the soundness of  doxastic reasoning. 
Consider practical reasoning again. As we have already seen, the fact that 
practical reasoning must have a substantive aim means that there must be 
some mark we are trying to identify whenever we are attempting to figure out 
what to do. When we engage in practical reasoning, the action we are trying 
to identify is the action that most completely displays that mark, whatever it 
is. We can therefore measure the soundness of  practical reasoning against 
that mark, just as we measure the soundness of  doxastic reasoning against 
the aim of  truth. 
It may be helpful here, following Pamela Hieronymi, to think of  reason-
ing in terms of  questions. According to Hieronymi, reasoning is the attempt to 
answer or settle a question. Certain attitudes and actions – those formed on 
the basis of  reasoning – embody one’s answers to the relevant questions.13 
Practical reasoning is the attempt to answer the question what to do, doxastic 
reasoning is the attempt to answer the question what to believe, and so forth. 
But these are merely formal characterizations of  the questions that drive 
practical and doxastic reasoning. They correspond to the formal aims of  rea-
soning discussed by Velleman. There must be more to practical reasoning 
than the question what to do. That is, there must be some other, more substan-
tive question we are attempting to settle when we attempt to settle the ques-
tion what to do, and the intention or action with which our reasoning con-
cludes will therefore embody our answer to this more substantive question. 
Suppose, then – just for the purposes of  illustration – that Jeremy Ben-
tham’s psychological hedonism is true. According to Bentham, “nature has 
placed mankind under the governance of  two sovereign masters, pain and 
                                                
12 Velleman (2004: 288). 
13 Hieronymi (2005: 443-44). 






pleasure. It is for them alone … to determine what we shall do.”14 One way to 
interpret Bentham here is as making a claim about practical reasoning: practi-
cal reasoning aims at identifying the most pleasurable course of  action. If  
Bentham is correct, then – as Hieronymi would put it – when we engage in 
deliberation about what to do, we are attempting to settle a substantive ques-
tion about pleasure: What is the most pleasurable course of  action? And 
once we have identified this question, we can understand the soundness of  
practical reasoning in terms borrowed from our discussion of  the soundness 
of  doxastic reasoning. Our attempt to answer the question that drives practi-
cal reasoning – and thus our reasoning itself  – will be sound if  and only if  
the premises upon which we rely in arriving at our answer are true and con-
firm or otherwise support that answer. 
We must tread carefully, though, for Hieronymi’s talk of  questions and 
answers may make this move appear simpler than it really is. My application 
of  the model of  soundness drawn from doxastic reasoning to the practical 
case may seem straightforward only because it can be difficult to see how the 
answer to a question one asks oneself  could be anything other than a judg-
ment or belief. Returning to the Bentham example, it is difficult to see how 
the answer to the question “What is the most pleasurable course of  action?” 
could be anything other than a judgment or belief  to the effect that this 
(where “this” denotes some act) is the most pleasurable course of  action. 
Now, it is certainly easy to see how the truth of  the premises of  practical rea-
soning could confirm or otherwise support the truth of  a conclusion that 
looks like that. But this is just because practical reasoning now looks an awful 
lot like a kind of  doxastic reasoning – namely, doxastic reasoning on the sub-
ject of  pleasure. The same will hold for any form of  reasoning so long as we 
think about the conclusion of  that form of  reasoning as the answer to a sub-
stantive question.15 
                                                
14 J. Bentham (1996/1789) An Introduction to the Principles of  Morals and Legislation, J. H. Burns 
and H. L. A. Hart, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 11. According to Montaigne, this view 
was once universally accepted: “All the opinions in the world agree on this – that pleasure is 
our goal” ((1958) “That to Philosophize Is to Learn to Die,” in D. M. Frame, trans., The 
Complete Essays of  Montaigne, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 56). 
15 Hieronymi urges us not to take her metaphorical talk of  questions and answers too literal-
ly. She maintains that all sorts of  attitudes can “embody their subject’s answer to some ques-
tion” ((2009) “Two Kinds of  Agency,” in L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou, eds., Mental Actions, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 138). For example, “having settled for oneself  (positive-
ly) the question of  whether to φ …, one therein intends to φ” (138). That may seem reason-
able, and it may not seem to entail that practical reasoning is just a species of  doxastic rea-
soning. Yet we cannot understand practical reasoning merely as the attempt to settle the ques-
tion of  whether to φ. That is at most a formal description of  the aim of  practical reasoning, 
and as Velleman argues, there must also be a substantive description of  that aim. Once we 
frame the question that drives practical reasoning in the terms of  that substantive descrip-
tion, it will be much harder to resist the conclusion that the outcome of  practical reasoning 
is a judgment. How could anything other than a judgment constitute an answer to a substan-
tive question? Of  course, we can always simply stipulate that attitudes like resentment and 
intention can “embody” one’s answers to questions, but once we do that the metaphor of  






Of  course, plenty of  philosophers – cognitivists about practical reason-
ing – maintain that the conclusion of  practical reasoning really is a belief  
about some substantive matter, and thus that practical reasoning just is a spe-
cies of  doxastic reasoning.16 Were we to accept cognitivism, then any applica-
tion of  my descriptive account of  the soundness of  doxastic reasoning to the 
case of  practical reasoning would be unnecessary, for we would already have 
an account of  the latter simply in virtue of  having one of  the former. Yet 
cognitivism about practical reasoning is controversial, to say the least: most 
philosophers of  action believe that practical reasoning concludes either in a 
distinctively practical attitude or in an action.17 Fortunately, the success of  my 
reductive proposal does not hinge on the truth of  cognitivism. We need not 
assume that the conclusion of  practical reasoning is a belief  in order to tell a 
descriptive story about sound practical reasoning that parallels the familiar 
descriptive story about sound doxastic reasoning. Cognitivism would make 
that story especially tidy, but it is not essential. 
Suppose, then – pace cognitivism – that practical reasoning normally 
concludes in an action. Such reasoning must still be governed by a substan-
tive aim, and the rules of  inference in practical reasoning must still be con-
ducive to achieving that aim. But this means that the premises of  a practical 
inference will support the concluding action just in case those same premises 
would confirm or support the belief  that that action achieves the relevant 
aim better than any available alternative. Put more schematically, if  the dis-
tinctive aim of  practical reasoning is A, then practical reasoning that con-
cludes in φ-ing will be sound just in case doxastic reasoning that proceeded 
from the same premises and concluded in the belief  that φ-ing best achieves 
A would be sound. This follows merely from the idea that practical reasoning 
is governed by a substantive aim. 
To see how, return once again to Bentham’s hedonism. If  practical rea-
soning aims at pleasure, then the rules of  inference in practical reasoning 
must be pleasure-conducive – that is, they must be designed to point us in 
the direction of  the most pleasurable actions. We reason in accordance with 
the rules of  practical reasoning, then, only to the extent that the premises of  
                                                
questions and answers starts to seem pointless, for we start to lose our grip on what it means 
to say that reasoning is the attempt to answer a question. I am indebted to Nishi Shah for 
helpful discussion of  Hieronymi’s view. 
16 Cognitivism about practical reasoning has a distinguished pedigree. Its proponents over 
the past 50 years include R. Audi (1973) “Intending,” Journal of  Philosophy 70(13): 387-403; G. 
Harman (1976) “Practical Reasoning,” Review of  Metaphysics 29(3): 431-63; W. A. Davis (1984) 
“A Causal Theory of  Intending,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21(1): 43-54; Velleman  
(1989, chs. 3-4); and Setiya (2007: 21-56). 
17 For the former view, see M. Bratman (1987) Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. For the latter view, often associated with Aristotle, see S. 
Tenenbaum (2007) “The Conclusion of  Practical Reason,” in Moral Psychology, Amsterdam: 
Rodopi; and J. Dancy (2009) “Action, Content and Inference,” in J. Hyman and H. Glock, 
eds., Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P. M. S. Hacker, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 278-98. 






our reasoning support the conclusion that the action we ultimately perform is 
the most pleasurable one available to us. Consider a specific instance of  prac-
tical reasoning. If  I were to choose one book over another because it was 
recommended by Oprah Winfrey, my practical reasoning would be sound 
only if  the rule of  following Oprah’s book recommendations were pleasure-
conducive. But this rule would be pleasure-conducive only if  the fact that 
Oprah recommended a book confirmed or otherwise supported the conclu-
sion that the book would provide pleasure. And so my practical reasoning in 
this case – that is, my reasoning from Oprah’s recommendation to my choice 
of  the recommended book – would be sound only if  the corresponding dox-
astic reasoning were sound. The soundness of  the former is nothing more 
than a reflection of  the soundness of  the latter. 
Crucially, none of  this depends on the details of  Bentham’s view. We 
could construct a structurally identical argument given any account of  practi-
cal reasoning’s substantive aim. Moreover, none of  this depends on the rea-
soning under consideration being practical reasoning. Take any form of  rea-
soning you like: reasoning about what to desire, resent, admire, or respect. It 
must be regulated by a substantive aim. And thus the soundness of  that form 
of  reasoning will mirror the soundness of  doxastic reasoning about the rele-
vant aim. 
I think we should actually accept a stronger conclusion here, for I be-
lieve that this is just what the soundness of  reasoning consists in. In other 
words, I think there is more than a merely biconditional relation here. If  
practical reasoning aims at pleasure, then my choosing a book on the basis of  
Oprah’s recommendation is sound reasoning because that recommendation 
constitutes evidence that the book will provide more pleasure than the alter-
natives. Put another way, the fact that Oprah recommended this book figures 
in sound practical reasoning in virtue of the fact that it is evidence for the con-
clusion that the book is the most pleasurable one available. This suggests that 
– if  Bentham is right about the aim of  practical reasoning – sound practical 
reasoning just is reasoning in which true premises confirm or otherwise sup-
port the conclusion that the chosen action is the most pleasurable of  those 
available. And if  the difference between sound and unsound practical reason-
ing can be articulated in purely descriptive terms, then the property of  
soundness turns out to be both normative and descriptive. The same goes 
for the property of  being a reason for action, at least if  reasons are just con-
siderations that figure in sound reasoning. The normative property of  being a 
reason for action turns out to be identical to the descriptive property of  be-
ing evidence that some course of  action will maximize A, where A is the aim 
of  practical reasoning. 
Of  course, when we are dealing with apparently normative properties 
like soundness, we cannot simply assume that necessary co-extension entails 
identity. Philosophers opposed to reductionism in metaethics will maintain 
that even if  it is necessarily true that reasoning is sound just in case it has 
some descriptive property – and, for that matter, even if  it is necessarily true 






that reasoning is sound because (or in virtue of  the fact that) it has that descrip-
tive property – the soundness of  reasoning cannot be identical to (and thus 
reduced to) that descriptive property. This opposition to reduction is rooted 
in the intuition that drives G. E. Moore’s open question argument – namely, 
the thought that the normative is “just too different” from the descriptive for 
the former to be reducible to the latter.18 Below I shall argue that however 
appropriate this reaction may be when we are confronted with other reduc-
tive proposals, it arises with nowhere near the same force here. First, though, 




One challenge facing the view that normative reasons are premises of  sound 
reasoning is to account for the different “weights” of  reasons. Most reasons 
are pro tanto: they count in favor of  some response but can be outweighed or 
overridden by other reasons. The fact that some consideration is a good rea-
son for me to φ is perfectly consistent with there being other, better reasons 
for me not to φ. So, while there may be something to be said for my φ-ing, 
there may be much more to be said for my ψ-ing. 
This seems like a problem for the view that reasons are premises of  
sound reasoning. After all, if  a reason is outweighed by countervailing con-
siderations, then surely reasoning from that consideration to the conclusion it 
supports would be unsound. For example, the fact that I promised to meet 
you at the airport is a reason for me to do so. But if  I can save lives by break-
ing my promise (and leaving you to take a taxi), then surely reasoning from 
the fact that I promised to the intention to pick you up would be unsound. 
We seem to have a reason – the fact that I promised – that does not figure as 
a premise in sound reasoning that concludes with the action favored by that 
reason. 
Setiya attempts to solve this problem by casting his version of  the view 
that reasons are premises of  sound reasoning in terms of  motivation. Ac-
cording to Setiya, a reason to φ “is a premise for sound reasoning to a desire 
or motivation to φ.”19 This looks like a solution because sound reasoning can 
move me to φ while also and to a much greater extent moving me to ψ. 
When it does, my reason to φ will figure in sound reasoning that concludes in 
my being moved to φ without figuring in sound reasoning that concludes in 
my φ-ing. So, although I would be reasoning unsoundly were I to deliberate 
from the fact that I promised to pick you up at the airport to my intending to 
do so (at least given the countervailing considerations), my reasoning would 
be perfectly sound were I to deliberate from the fact that I promised to pick 
you up to my merely being moved to do so, so long as I was more strongly 
                                                
18 D. Enoch (2011) Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of  Robust Realism, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, p. 100. 
19 Setiya (2014: 221, emphasis added). 






moved to break my promise and save lives instead. Setiya’s appeal to motiva-
tion as the conclusion of  sound reasoning also provides him with a straight-
forward account of  the weight of  reasons: “[W]e can measure the relative 
weight of  reasons by the relative strength of  motivation.”20 
Way complains that although Setiya’s approach works well when applied 
to reasons for action, it makes less sense when applied to reasoning that con-
cludes in an attitude like belief  or admiration, for it is not at all clear how we 
should understand the idea of  being motivated to believe or to admire. I 
worry there is a more basic problem here, though. Once I realize I can save 
lives by breaking my promise and leaving you to find your own way home 
from the airport, I am not moved or motivated to pick you up at all. I recog-
nize that my promise counts in favor of  picking you up, but this just does not 
motivate me in the face of  the countervailing considerations. Of  course, I 
may regret that I will not be there to meet you, but I need not feel any moti-
vational tug (or nudge) in the direction of  the airport. If  that is correct, then 
it is a mistake to identify the normative force of  a reason with the motivation 
produced by sound deliberation from that reason. 
 My preferred solution to the problem of  pro tanto reasons more closely 
resembles Way’s. Way observes that “we can distinguish between the claim 
that it is [sound] reasoning to move from the belief  that p to φ-ing and the 
claim that it is [sound] reasoning to move from the belief  that p to φ-ing given 
further attitudes you might have.”21 So, although I would be reasoning soundly were 
I to deliberate from the fact that I promised to pick you up to the intention 
to do so, I would not be reasoning soundly were I to arrive at this conclusion 
if  my premises included the further thought that I could save lives by break-
ing my promise. Reasoning from my promise to the intention to pick you up 
is sound but defeasible: it is defeated by reasoning that incorporates the addi-
tional premise about saving lives and that concludes with the corresponding 
intention. The weights of  reasons, then, are a function of  the defeasibility of  
the sound reasoning in which they figure. More specifically, where p is a rea-
son to φ and q is a reason to ψ, p outweighs q if  the sound reasoning in 
which p figures defeats the sound reasoning in which q figures. 
My suggestion above that there are degrees of  soundness mirrors Way’s 
claim that sound reasoning can be defeated. Way never explains what sound-
ness involves, though, and so we are left wondering precisely how reasons 
count in favor of  the responses for which they are reasons. My view provides 
illumination here. Reasons count in favor of  the responses for which they are 
reasons by being evidence that those responses will achieve the aim of  the relevant sort of  
reasoning. Sound reasoning that concludes in φ-ing defeats sound reasoning 
that concludes in ψ-ing just in the case the evidence that φ-ing will achieve 
the relevant aim is stronger than the evidence that ψ-ing will achieve that aim. 
                                                
20 Setiya (2014: 229). 
21 Way (forthcoming: 20, emphasis added). 






A reason, then, is evidence; and the stronger the evidence, the weightier the 
reason. 
Now, however, my account of  reasons is starting to look like a version 
of  the account proposed by Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star. According to 
Kearns and Star, “a reason to φ is simply evidence that one ought to φ.”22 If  
we assume that the aim of  reasoning is always to arrive at an all-things-
considered “ought”-judgment, then these two views are essentially indistin-
guishable. If, for instance, the aim of  practical reasoning is to do what one 
ought to do, then the view that a reason to φ is a premise in sound reasoning 
that concludes in φ-ing just amounts to the view that a reason to φ is evi-
dence that one ought to φ.23 
The reductionist agenda motivating my view sets it apart from Kearns 
and Star’s, though. Like Way’s, my account purports to be a constitutive account 
of  reasons: it is supposed to shed light on what it is to be a reason.24 It will also 
be a reductive account only if  it identifies what it is to be a reason in purely 
descriptive terms. And this means that, unlike Kearns and Star, I must reject 
the idea that practical reasoning – or any other sort of  reasoning, for that 
matter – is necessarily carried out under the guise of  the normative.25 If  prac-
tical reasoning aims at doing what we ought to do under that description, then 
the view that reasons are premises in sound reasoning, together with my ac-
count of  soundness, will not yield a reductive account of  reasons for action. 
Reasons for action will be considerations that figure in reasoning that is ex-
plicitly about what one ought to do, and we will therefore need some inde-
pendent grip on facts about what we ought to do before we can better un-
derstand what reasons are. It is a presupposition of  my account, then, that 
practical reasoning need not be carried out under the guise of  the norma-
tive.26 Without this presupposition, we cannot understand what it is to be a 
                                                
22 S. Kearns and D. Star (2009) “Reasons as Evidence,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4: 216. 
23 All of  these views – Setiya’s, Way’s, Kearns and Star’s, and mine – must address Jonathan 
Dancy’s claim that some of  the considerations that figure as premises in reasoning (and that 
are evidence for the relevant conclusion) are enabling (or disabling) conditions or intensifiers 
(or attenuators), rather than reasons. I do not have the space to address Dancy’s arguments 
here. The line of  response I favor is broadly in keeping with replies Kearns and Star offer in 
“Weighing Reasons” (2003) Journal of  Moral Philosophy 10: 84-86, as well as with some (but 
not all) of  Setiya’s replies in (2014: 226-28). 
24 Compare Way (forthcoming: 6). 
25 Although they never take up the question explicitly, Kearns and Star do suggest at various 
points that practical reasoning is explicitly about what one ought to do. In the course of  
defending their view, for instance, they note that “by ‘reliable practical reasoning’ we mean 
practical reasoning that is generally successful in terms of  issuing in correct judgments con-
cerning what it is one ought to do” (2009: 224). 
26 I defend this presupposition elsewhere; see “Ethics and Practical Reasoning” (unpublished 
manuscript). In denying that practical reasoning is carried out under the guise of  the norma-
tive, I follow a long line of  distinguished philosophers of  action, including H. Frankfurt 
(2004) “Disengaging Reason,” in R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler and M. Smith, eds., Rea-
son and Value: Themes from the Philosophy of  Joseph Raz, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 






reason for action in purely descriptive terms, in which case a unifying and 




The most familiar objection to reductive accounts of  reasons is that they fail 
to capture what is distinctive about reasons – namely, their normativity. Our 
insight into the nature of  reasons extends beyond the specific reasons we 
grasp. We also understand, at least to some extent, what it is to be a reason. This 
generally implicit understanding is reflected in various platitudes about rea-
sons, such as: reasons count in favor of  the actions or attitudes for which 
they are reasons; reasons have a special kind of  authority over our responses 
and our deliberations; reasons guide our behavior and attitudes; judgments 
about reasons have a motivational or practical upshot; and so forth. The 
standard objection to reductive accounts of  reasons is rooted in the convic-
tion that any such account will fail to do justice to at least some of  these plat-
itudes. According to this objection, no descriptive property can play all of  the 
roles the property of  being a reason is supposed to play, and a theory that 
cannot capture all of  these roles cannot be correct. Whatever descriptive 
property that theories identifies, then, it must be something other than the 
property of  being a reason. 
Versions of  this worry figure prominently in discussions of  metanorma-
tive reductionism. In their survey of  fin de siècle ethics, Stephen Darwall, 
Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton suggest that resistance to reductionism on 
these grounds is one of  the lasting legacies of  Moore’s open question argu-
ment. For although Moore’s argument is not “a proof  of  a fallacy,” it never-
theless “brings to the fore certain characteristic features of  … normative 
[properties] … that seem to stand in the way of  our accepting” a reductive 
account of  those properties.27 With respect to any reductionist proposal that 
explicates the property of  being a normative reason in terms of  some de-
scriptive property P, it seems perfectly coherent to acknowledge that x is P 
                                                
122-27; J. D. Velleman (1992) “The Guise of  the Good,” Noûs 26(1): 3-26; M. Bratman 
(2003) “A Desire of  One’s Own,” Journal of  Philosophy 100(5): 221-42; and Setiya (2007). 
Interestingly, even if  practical reasoning is carried out under the guise of  something 
other than the normative, there remains a sense in which my view is a version of  Kearns and 
Star’s view that reasons to φ are evidence that one ought to φ, at least if  we accept that one 
ought to φ just in case one has most reason to φ. On my view, a reason to φ is evidence that 
φ-ing would achieve the aim of  the relevant sort of  reasoning. It is also, therefore, evidence 
that φ-ing is what one has most reason to do. If  one ought to φ just in case one has most 
reason to φ, then a reason will also be evidence that one ought to φ. Crucially, though, it will 
be evidence that one ought to φ in virtue of being evidence that φ-ing would best achieve the 
aim of  the relevant sort of  reason. It is this final thought that distinguishes my account from 
Kearns and Star’s. On my view, practical reasoning does aim at doing what one ought to do, 
but not under that description. 
27 S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton (1992) “Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends,” 
Philosophical Review 101(1): 116. 






while also wondering whether x is genuinely a reason. According to Darwall, 
Gibbard, and Railton, this question’s intelligibility at least “appears to call for 
some [account of  reasons] other than the reductionist proposal.”28 David 
Enoch expresses similar concerns when he claims that normative facts and 
properties are “just too different from [descriptive] ones to be a subset of  
them.”29 The distinctiveness of  normative properties leads Thomas Nagel to 
conclude that “if  values are objective, they must be so in their own right, and 
not through reducibility to some other kind of  objective fact. They have to 
be objective values, not objective anything else.”30 
I take these sorts of  worries to be the most significant challenge con-
fronting reductive accounts of  reasons.31 I believe that the view I outlined 
above is uniquely well-equipped to meet this challenge, however. 
One feature often associated with the normativity of  reasons involves 
guidance: reasons for action are considerations for which we can act; reasons for 
belief  are considerations for which we can believe; and so forth. The view that 
reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning clearly captures this 
aspect of  their normativity. Consider reasons for action. If  practical reason-
ing is reasoning that issues in an intention or action, I act for some reason by 
arriving at an intention or performing an action on the basis of  reasoning in 
which that reason figures as a premise. A reason guides my behavior by figur-
ing in an actual instance of  my practical reasoning and thereby playing a role 
                                                
28 Darwall, et. al. (1992: 177). For similar takes on the antireductionist significance of  the 
open question argument, see P. Railton (1989) “Naturalism and Prescriptivity,” Social Philoso-
phy and Policy 7(1): 158; D. Wiggins (1993) “A Neglected Position?” in J. Haldane and C. 
Wright, eds., Reality, Representation, and Projection, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 330-
34; C. Rosati (1995) “Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument,” Noûs 
29(1): 46-70, and (2003) “Agency and the Open Question Argument,” Ethics 113(3): 490-527; 
T. M. Scanlon (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
pp. 57-60; R. Shafer-Landau (2003) Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 95; 
and C. R. Pigden (2012) “Identifying Goodness,” Australasian Journal of  Philosophy 90(1): 93-
109. 
29 Enoch (2011: 100). Compare Derek Parfit’s “normativity objection” in (2011) On What 
Matters, Vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 324-27. 
30 T. Nagel (1986) The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 138. 
31 This is not the only challenge, of  course. Reductive accounts also face questions of  exten-
sional adequacy – worries that they are inconsistent with our judgments or intuitions about 
the reasons we have. I do not dwell on such worries here. For one thing, in the absence of  
an account of  the aim or object of  a particular kind of  reasoning, my reductive proposal 
does not tell us much about which considerations are reasons and which are not. It merely 
tells us that our reasons, whatever they are, will be a function of  the point or aim of  the rel-
evant sort of  reasoning. Since I am not offering an account of  the point or aim of  any kind 
of  reasoning, we are not yet in any position to evaluate the overall extensional adequacy of  
the view I have proposed. What is more, at least some degree of  extensional revision should 
be expected on any reductive view. The whole point of  reduction is to shed light on some-
thing we do not yet fully understand. And as Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton have urged, once 
we acknowledge that our intuitive notions of  soundness and of  a reason are plagued by at 
least some degree of  confusion or ambiguity, we can “hardly expect … any philosophical 
account of  them that is not itself  confused and ambiguous [to] have just the right intuitive 
‘fit’” (1992: 178). 






in the production of  my intention or action. An analogous story can be told 
for various other kinds of  normative reasons. 
There is more to the normativity of  reasons than guidance, though. Rea-
sons do not merely guide; they do so with authority. It is with respect to this 
distinctive sort of  authority that so many reductive accounts of  the norma-
tive fall short. Does the view articulated here fare any better? Notice first that 
according to this view, normative force is more than the merely motivational 
or guiding force exerted by considerations that figure in reasoning. Consider-
ations can figure in reasoning without doing so soundly: they can be false or 
irrelevant (and thereby fail to support or confirm the truth of  the relevant 
conclusion). A normative reason must be more than a guide; it must be a 
sound guide. A reason for action, for instance, must be more than merely 
practical or motivational; it must be soundly practical. A consideration exhibits 
normative force or authority, then, by playing a role in sound reasoning – rea-
soning in which true premises provide genuine support for a conclusion. The 
normative force of  reasons therefore involves more than guidance. It is also 
a kind of  logical force.32 On my view it is soundness – or the logical force of  
truth and evidence – that plays the role of  normative authority. 
I believe that it plays this role quite convincingly. Considerations of  
soundness have undeniable authority over our reasoning. One cannot engage 
in reasoning without attempting to do so soundly, for the whole point of  rea-
soning is to arrive at a conclusion that is supported by true premises. To re-
turn once again to Bentham’s psychological hedonism, if  practical reasoning 
aims at pleasure, then the whole point of  practical reasoning is to arrive at 
the most pleasurable course of  action. And in that case it seems undeniable 
that evidence about which course of  action would be the most pleasurable 
has authority over my deliberations. This is why I think the reductionist ap-
proach I am proposing can meet the open question challenge head on. The 
connection between reasons and sound reasoning seems no less platitudinous 
than it did before. There just does not seem to be any room to question 
whether a consideration that bears on sound reasoning is a reason. With re-
spect to any consideration that figures in sound deliberation concluding with 
your φ-ing, it does not seem to be an open question whether that considera-
tion is a reason for you to φ (or whether it counts in favor of  your φ-ing). 
Put more schematically, if  A is the distinctive aim of  reasoning about wheth-
er to φ, then it does not seem to be an open question whether evidence that 
φ-ing would best achieve A is a reason to φ. It makes no sense to wonder 
                                                
32 This is why I do not characterize my view as a form of  reductive naturalism. I am not at all 
confident that the logical notion of  validity – and its probabilistic or confirmational coun-
terparts in the inductive and abductive realm – can be understood in naturalistic terms. Does 
this lessen the interest in my reductive proposal? It might, if  the only motivation for reduc-
tion is a prior commitment to metaphysical naturalism. If, on the other hand, the motivation 
for reduction is the opacity or “queerness” of  normativity – and if, for whatever reason, 
logic, modality and probability seem less queer or problematic – then the reduction will pro-
vide an illuminating explanation of  something that would otherwise remain opaque.  






whether you have reason to act or to believe in accordance with the conclu-
sion of  sound reasoning, even once we understand soundness in terms of  
the relevant aim or object. Moreover, it is difficult to see how any other kind 
of  consideration could authoritatively govern our deliberations and close the 
relevant question in this way. Only considerations of  evidence or soundness 
seem to have the kind of  authority over our reasoning that reasons are sup-
posed to have. 
One might worry that my view does not close the open question so 
much as relocate it. Even if  there is no room to question whether a consider-
ation that bears on sound reasoning really is a reason, it may seem that there 
is room to question whether reasoning that satisfies my descriptive account 
of  soundness really is sound.33 Suppose that A is the distinctive aim of  some 
form of  reasoning, and suppose that the bulk of  the evidence supports the 
conclusion that φ-ing would best achieve A. Is it an open question whether 
reasoning that concludes in φ-ing and that does so on the basis of  that evi-
dence is sound? It certainly does not seem to be an open question in the 
doxastic case. And, as I argued above, if  it does not look like an open ques-
tion with respect to doxastic reasoning, then it should not look like an open 
question with respect to any other sort of  reasoning, at least once we take 
seriously the idea that reasoning is always driven by a substantive object or 
aim. Were we genuinely to accept Bentham’s suggestion that practical reason-
ing aims at pleasure, I think it would not appear to be an open question 
whether reasoning that concluded in the most pleasurable action (and that 
did so on the basis of  the relevant evidence) is sound. 
I suspect that questions of  this sort seem open to many philosophers – 
at least when they are questions about sound practical reasoning – only be-
cause these philosophers cannot envision a plausible account of  the substan-
tive aim of  practical reasoning that is supported by nonnormative considera-
tions. If  you are not convinced that practical reasoning aims at pleasure – and 
I have nowhere suggested that you should be – then of  course the question 
of  whether sound practical reasoning involves only considerations of  pleas-
urability will seem wide open. Actually, given that Bentham’s view is wildly 
implausible, the question probably seems closed but in the opposite direc-
tion. Yet my proposed reduction does not rest on any particular account of  
the aim of  practical reasoning. It rests merely on the idea that some substan-
tive aim drives practical reasoning. We may never discover this aim; the evi-
dence may be too diffuse and thin. But I maintain that if  we were to discover 




                                                
33 I am grateful to Nishi Shah, Kevin Coffey, and an anonymous referee for pressing me on 
this point. 








To see just how well my view captures the normative authority of  reasons 
and closes the open question, it may be helpful to compare it with two prom-
inent, competing reductive accounts of  reasons: Mark Schroeder’s hypotheti-
calism and Sharon Street’s constructivism. 
Consider first Schroeder’s view, presented most completely in his book, 
Slaves of  the Passions. According to Schroeder, what makes something a reason 
for me to act is that it is appropriately related to the object of  one of  my de-
sires. More specifically: 
 
For all propositions r, agents x, and actions a, if  r is a reason for x to do a, that is 
because there is some p such that x has a desire whose object is p, and the truth of  
r is part of  what explains why x’s doing a promotes p.34 
 
Schroeder presents this thesis as a reductive account of  the property of  being 
a reason for action, and he acknowledges that it must therefore confront 
some version of  the open question argument. In particular, it must confront 
Enoch’s charge that the property of  being a reason is “just too different” to 
be reducible to any descriptive property, and thus that any purportedly reduc-
tive account of  the former will accomplish nothing more than a change of  
subject. Schroeder’s task, in short, is to demonstrate that his account of  rea-
sons for action captures rather than eliminates their normativity. 
Schroeder contends that the best way to meet this challenge is to show 
that his account of  reasons is not wildly out of  sync with our considered in-
tuitions about what we do and do not have reason to do. And so he devotes 
the central chapters of  his book to arguing for this conclusion. But even if  
these kinds of  extensional concerns can be alleviated, open question worries 
remain. Even if  the property of  being a reason is largely (or entirely) co-
extensive with the property of  being related in the appropriate way to the 
object of  one of  my desires, we may still have good reason to deny that the 
former can be reduced to the latter.35 In particular, we may have good reason 
to conclude that the latter property lacks some of  the features in virtue of  
which the former is normative. It may share some of  those features, of  
course. For example, it is easy enough to see how I might be guided by a con-
sideration in virtue of  that consideration’s being appropriately related to the 
object of  one of  my desires. It is less easy to see, however, how such a con-
sideration has any kind of  authority over me or my deliberations. Schroeder’s 
view entails that my wanting something endows the object of  my want with a 
special kind of  authority over my practical deliberations. Actually, it entails 
                                                
34 M. Schroeder (2007) Slaves of  the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 30. Schroed-
er is concerned only with reasons for action here, and so the comparison will be limited but 
still, hopefully, illustrative. 
35 Schroeder himself  rejects the view that necessary co-extensiveness is sufficient for proper-
ty identity. See ibid.: 67-72. 






something more – namely, that this is just what that special kind of  authority 
consists in. But the mere fact that I desire something does not seem to in-
volve or give rise to any sort of  authority. If  I ask you what it is for some-
thing to be a reason for me to act, and you reply by describing the relevant 
relation to the things I desire, I may reasonably complain that you have 
changed the subject. There is more to the authority of  reasons for action 
than the fact that they reveal the ways in which I might satisfy my desires or 
achieve my ends, whatever they happen to be.36 
The problem here is that the thing Schroeder has tasked with playing the 
role of  normative authority is not doing so convincingly. This is what casts 
doubt on his proposed reduction. Notice that similar doubts cannot be cast 
on the view I have proposed. If  I ask you what it is for something to be a 
reason for me to act, and you reply by describing the role considerations can 
play in sound practical reasoning, then I cannot reasonably accuse you of  
having changed the subject. Soundness is plausibly cast as the source of  the 
authority of  reasons for action, whereas desire is only implausibly so cast. 
That is why we should prefer my proposed reduction to Schroeder’s. 
What about Street’s constructivism? According to Street, normative 
questions are “questions about what is entailed from within the standpoint 
of  a creature who values things” or judges things to be valuable.37 We answer 
such questions simply by determining what follows from a creature’s evalua-
tive standpoint. Translated into an account of  reasons, this becomes: 
 
The fact that X is a reason to Y for agent A is constituted by the fact that the 
judgment that X is a reason to Y (for A) withstands scrutiny from the standpoint 
of  A’s other judgments about reasons.38 
 
Street does not take the notion of  what is entailed by one’s other normative 
judgments – or of  what withstands scrutiny from the standpoint of  one’s other 
normative judgments – to be normative. Rather, it is something like a logical 
notion, which is what lends her constructivism its reductive air.39 On the re-
                                                
36 Compare Warren Quinn: “How can a … state whose central significance in this context is 
to help explain our tendency to act toward a certain end, or in accordance with a certain 
principle, rationalize our pursuit of  the end or our deference to the principle? How can the 
fact that we are set up to go in a certain direction make it (even prima facie) rational to decide 
to go in that direction? How can it even contribute to its rationality?” ((1993) “Putting Ra-
tionality in Its Place,” in Morality and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 236). 
See also T. M. Scanlon (2014) Being Realistic about Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 6-7. 
37 S. Street (2010) “What Is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?” Philosophy Compass 
5(5): 374. 
38 S. Street (2008) “Constructivism about Reasons,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3: 223. 
39 Actually, it is more than a logical notion. It is also a constitutive notion, insofar as what with-
stands scrutiny from the standpoint of  your normative judgments is partly a function of  
what is constitutive of  holding such judgments. See Street (2008: 227-31). It is ultimately 
unclear in what sense Street’s constructivism is reductive. For her discussion of  this issue, see 
Street (2008: 239-42). For doubts about whether this sort of  constructivism constitutes a 






sulting view, facts about reasons consist in nothing more than facts about 
what follows from within the point of  view of  one’s other normative judg-
ments. We therefore come to understand what it is for something to be a rea-
son by first understanding the attitude of  taking or judging something to be a 
reason, where that attitude is supposed to be one on which we have some 
sort of  prior and independent purchase. 
Once again, though, open question worries remain, for it is not at all 
clear whether Street’s constructivism captures the normativity of  reasons. Of  
course, as was the case with Schroeder’s hypotheticalism, it is easy to see how 
reasons function as guides on Street’s view. It is less easy to see how they do so 
with any authority, however. To be sure, if  we presuppose that our starting set 
of  normative judgments is authoritative, then it certainly makes sense to treat 
the judgments that genuinely withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of  that 
starting set as similarly authoritative. But why should we ascribe any authority 
to those initial judgments? Just as there is nothing terribly authoritative about 
my desiring something, so is there nothing terribly authoritative about my 
judging that I have a reason to do or to believe something. I may just be 
wrong. According to Street, this judgment acquires authority by withstanding 
scrutiny from the standpoint of  my other normative judgments, but that only 
pushes the question back: Whence comes the authority of  those judgments? 
The worry here is not that Street has no answer to this question. After 
all, her answer will be the same as before: the authority of  these judgments 
stems from the fact that they withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of  my 
other normative judgments (and, presumably, from the standpoint of  one an-
other). Rather, the worry is that it is not clear why their withstanding such 
scrutiny would endow them with any authority over my deliberations. That is, 
it is not clear why my coherently judging these considerations to be reasons 
would make it the case that they really are reasons. 
Street’s constructivism is rooted in the idea that there is something au-
thoritative about verdicts delivered from the normative point of  view, and 
thus something authoritative about the normative point of  view itself. But 
the normative point of  view is just the point of  view of  one’s judgments 
about reasons. So, the capacity to withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of  
those judgments is what plays the role of  normative authority on Street’s 
view. Lingering suspicions of  open questions suggest that it plays this role 
unconvincingly. If  I ask you what it is for p to be a reason for me to φ, and 
you reply by describing the way in which the judgment that p is a reason for 
me to φ follows from within my normative point of  view, I may again rea-
sonably complain that you have changed the subject. There must be more to 
the authority of  normative reasons than the fact that my judging them to be 
                                                
determinate account of  reasons for action, see N. Shah (2010) “The Limits of  Normative 
Detachment,” Proceedings of  the Aristotelian Society 110(3): 357-59. 






reasons would withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of  my other judg-
ments about reasons, whatever they happen to be.40 
Street might argue that the authority of  our other normative judgments 
resides in the fact that the process of  teasing out the logical and constitutive 
implications of  our normative judgments (together with the nonnormative 
facts) just is the process of  reasoning.41 In other words, she might argue that 
the standpoint of  our other normative judgments is authoritative in virtue of  
the fact that it is the standpoint we adopt when we engage in reasoning. That 
certainly seems like a step in the right direction, at least with respect to the 
kind of  open question worries we are currently considering. But notice that it 
is also a step in the direction of  my proposed view. On this alternative under-
standing of  Street’s constructivism, reasons are considerations that figure in 
sound reasoning, where reasoning is just reasoning from one’s normative 
judgments (together with the nonnormative facts) to further normative 
judgments. Yet now it is the account of  the nature of  sound reasoning – or 
of  the aim of  reasoning – that is pulling all of  the normative weight. Once 
Street’s view has been formulated as a version of  my view, it can meet the 
open question challenge with ease.42 
What makes the reduction I have proposed more plausible than these 
alternatives is the intrinsic authority that considerations of  soundness (or ev-
idence) have over one’s reasoning. Neither one’s desires (as on Schroeder’s 




                                                
40 Street’s most powerful response to this worry is to point out that the open question argu-
ment is only one source of  pressure on our understanding of  reasons for action among 
many. Another source of  pressure is her Darwinian Dilemma ((2006) “A Darwinian Dilem-
ma for Realist Theories of  Value,” Philosophical Studies 127(1): 109-66). The upshot of  the 
Darwinian Dilemma is that we cannot cleave to nonreductive realism without acknowledging 
that most of  our normative judgments are almost certainly false. Since any Moorean con-
cerns about Street’s constructivism pale in comparison to that unfortunate conclusion, we 
should opt for constructivism even if  it only imperfectly captures the authority of  reasons 
for action. This is an excellent strategy for responding to the open question argument, at 
least when the only alternative is nonreductive realism. When, however, other reductive or 
anti-realist views are in play – views that avoid the Darwinian Dilemma just as surely as 
Street’s does – we should opt for the one that best captures the authority of  reasons for ac-
tion. 
41 This would explain why she refers to the point of  view of  our normative judgments as 
“the practical point of  view” (2010: 366). 
42 Street comes closest to my view when she observes that “one way to present metaethical 
constructivism is as claiming that normative facts are constituted by facts about what is en-
tailed by the ‘rules of  practical reason’ in combination with the non-normative facts” (ibid.: 
373). 








In the opening chapter of  On What Matters, Derek Parfit declares that “it is 
hard to explain the concept of  a reason, or what the phrase ‘a reason’ 
means”: 
 
Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favor of  our having some 
attitude, or our acting in some way. But “counts in favor of ” means roughly “gives 
a reason for.” Like some other fundamental concepts, such as those involved in our 
thoughts about time, consciousness, and possibility, the concept of  a reason is in-
definable in the sense that it cannot be helpfully explained merely by using words.43 
 
Here Parfit is echoing T. M. Scanlon, who begins What We Owe to Each Other 
with essentially the same thought: 
 
Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to me to lead 
back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in favor of  it. “Counts in favor 
how?” one might ask. “By providing a reason for it” seems to be the only answer.44 
 
I hope that I have demonstrated just how much more we can say about what 
it is to be a reason, at least once we take seriously two ideas: first, that rea-
sons are considerations that figure as premises in sound reasoning, and se-
cond, that reasoning is always governed by a substantive object or aim. How 
does a reason count in favor of  some kind of  response? By figuring in sound 
reasoning that concludes with that response. How precisely does a reason 
figure in that reasoning? By being evidence for the conclusion that the re-
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43 D. Parfit (2011) On What Matters, Vol. 1, p. 31. 
44 Scanlon (1998: 17). 
45 I am indebted to Nic Bommarito, Kevin Coffey, David Enoch, Zoë Johnson King, Jessica 
Moss, David Owens, Gabriel Rabin, Mark Schroeder, Joshua Silverstein, Phyllis Silverstein, 
Daniel Star, Sharon Street, and David Velleman, as well as to two anonymous referees for the 
Journal of  Ethics & Social Philosophy, for helpful discussions of  the ideas in this paper or com-
ments on earlier drafts. Earlier versions of  the paper were presented to workshops at NYU 
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Michigan, and at the W. Maurice Young Centre for Applied Ethics at the University of  Brit-
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special thanks to Sarah Paul and Nishi Shah for reading and commenting on multiple drafts 
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